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Abstract 
World Peace (And How We Can Achieve It) looks towards a future where there is increasingly 
optimistic engagement with the concept of peace. Bellamy assesses why the world is the way 
it is before making suggestions for how the world can achieve peace. Bellamy suggests world 
peace is achievable and in the final chapter constructs his articles for world peace. This review 
essay engages with several themes in the book looking at how the history of international law 
is framed by the author before assessing Bellamy’s arguments in relation to the state and 
international organisations. Lastly, the essay casts a legal eye over the author’s articles for 
world peace. The articles will be of particular interest to readers in international law as they 
are embedded in the existing systems and structures of the prevailing international system. 
However, the articles contain the important inclusion of individuals and the role they play in 
achieving world peace. World Peace allows international lawyers to think more deeply about 
peace and the points made in this essay raise some issues that may be further debated as 
scholars map the paths to peace. 
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1 Introduction 
While not a book that directly addresses international law throughout, this is a text that has the 
potential to (re)shape the thinking of international legal scholars when it comes to peace. Alex 
Bellamy systematically breaks down many preconceptions about peace that are woven into our 
traditional understandings of international law. Key to Bellamy’s discussions of world peace 




are threads commonly found in international law scholarship, such as how it is a system 
constructed to bring states together to peacefully settle disputes and how international 
organisations are collectives that share values. It is rare to read a book that makes such profound 
claims in the opening pages that lay out a vision of the achievability of peace by overturning 
traditional understandings with ease. The first section of the book (Chapters 1-4) address the 
background of world peace and assesses theories for why the world is the way it is. The second 
section (Chapters 5-8) forms Bellamy’s assessment of how we can move towards world peace. 
A rich amount of content is covered with Bellamy giving a history of peace (Chapter 2), 
discussing whether humans are hard wired for war (Chapter 3), outlining how war is a 
contagion (Chapter 4), the continuing importance of the state (Chapter 5), the different costs 
of war (Chapter 6), the seemingly endless passion for war (Chapter 7), and lastly Bellamy’s 
articles for peace (Chapter 8). This review engages with the book by highlighting some areas 
where critiques could arise in international law with attention given to the systems and regimes 
which may help or hinder the achievement of peace. The review discusses issues, such as 
whether international humanitarian law (IHL) represents an effort to achieve peace, the role of 
the state, the universality of international law, and the legitimacy of international law in an 
interlinked and ever-connected global community. 
Before exploring the book in greater depth, it is important to try to summarise 
Bellamy’s vision of peace in Chapter 1. The book challenges the reader to view the pursuit of 
world peace as a serious question and not to become disillusioned by world peace as ‘naïve 
and utopian’ or an ‘intellectual fantasy’ (pp 3, 1). Bellamy recounts the decline of inter-state 
conflict and the rise of civil wars that today bring increased violence against civilians. Attention 
is also drawn to how the discussion of foreign affairs in the West is often dominated by the 
decline of the liberal and rules-based international order (p 3). Bellamy suggests the West has 
this preoccupation due to how war is seen to be universal and how peace is believed to be the 
anomaly while war remains ‘part of the human condition’ (p 4). Arguing world peace is 
possible Bellamy suggests; (1) peace is more common than we think; (2) we are not living 
through a decline of the liberal rules-based order; and (3) both war and peace are human 
creations (pp 5-9). To understand what is needed to achieve peace, Bellamy offers a definition 
of the term as ‘the absence and prevention of war (international and civil) and the management 
of conflict through peaceful means, implying some form of legitimate civil order’ (p 17). In 
discussing what peace involves Bellamy offers a critique of Galtung’s conception of ‘positive 
peace’ as the values of leftist European ideologies ‘masquerading as a great universal vision of 
peace’ and similarly challenges the notion of justice within peace (pp 15-16).1 Importantly, 
Bellamy sets the scene by asking the reader to view world peace not as a single grand project 
but instead as the result of multiple minor utopias that are possible (p 19). 
 
2 The history of international law  
The first area for critique is the history of peace and the coverage given to public international 
law. For international lawyers, whose history tend to begin in the 15-1600s with Hugo Grotius 
and the various other ‘fathers of international law’, it is useful that Bellamy draws on Greek 
progress on creating ‘peace leagues’ (p 25), early Indian doctrines on peace in the eight century 
 
1 See, eg, Johan Galtung, ‘Peace, Positive and Negative’ in Daniel J Christie (ed), The Encyclopedia 
of Peace Psychology (Wiley 2011).  




BCE (pp 25-26), Confucian and Daoist understandings of peace (p 26), and the Roman 
Empire’s Pax Romana (pp 26-30). Later philosophies and theories of peace are discussed such 
as Erasmus’ thoughts on how to achieve peace (p 31) and Kant’s Perpetual Peace (pp 34-37). 
International law is mentioned once we reach the work of Jeremy Bentham (p 38). This means 
there is an unusual omission of Grotius and his theories on just war that fundamentally 
defended the morality of war and embedded into international law the right of states to amass 
territory and property through war. Instead Bellamy focuses on how nineteenth century liberals 
sought to promote free trade and international law as an effort to ‘bind peoples together into a 
common humanity’ (pp 38-39). The issue though is that the foundations of international law 
are much less inclusive, focused on the self-interest of states, and ultimately resulted in the 
subjugation of much of the world. A significant intellectual history that includes an in-depth 
account of Grotius’s thinking, alongside other key developments in international law, has been 
recently provided by Oona Hathaway and Scott Shapiro in The Internationalists.2 Hathaway 
and Shapiro note that Grotius believed war was good and can be used to right a wrong such as 
collecting debts.3 His work also argues that navigation of the high seas is a natural right that 
we all possess as human beings. The problem though is that Grotius’s theories on international 
law were not applied to all human beings and natural rights were not applied when European 
powers conquered new territory. Scholars such as Alberico Gentili used international law to 
justify punitive war where deeds committed by native peoples were deemed to be particularly 
brutal and horrible by civilised European standards.4  
Jean d’Aspremont has lamented how international lawyers were the ‘complacent 
recipients’ of linear histories that were reproduced in scholarship until the more recent turn to 
critical histories that have rejected the liberal concept of history.5 D’Aspremont calls for 
research to go further and undertake radical historical critique to break from the traditional 
restrictions that have repressed the imagination of researchers.6 Academics must be critical of 
international law’s origins to avoid displaying international law as founded upon a ‘common 
humanity’ when that is far from the case. Bellamy’s history is not a radical critique which could 
hinder its usefulness for considering how we can best move toward peace today. That is to say, 
in the words of d’Aspremont, we must constantly re-write histories and counter-histories to 
rejuvenate disciplinary imagination.7 The same applies to thinking on peace. We must more 
closely assess the underlying assumptions found in histories of law and peace that are limiting 
our thinking on how best to strive for world peace. 
There is a similar lack of critique with regards to the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conferences 
and the resulting conventions (pp 40-42). Bellamy suggests the Hague Conventions enshrine 
ideas central to peace into international law for the first time noting the Conferences agreed the 
Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes and Convention respecting the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land. However, some critical scholars could argue the latter, 
which codified and expanded aspects of IHL, in fact perpetuates conflict as a legal, and by 
 
2 Oona A Hathaway and Scott J Shapiro, The Internationalists: And Their Plan to Outlaw War 
(Penguin 2018). See Chapter 1, ‘Hugo the Great’ 3. 
3 Ibid. 9. 
4 Ibid. 48-9. 
5 Jean d’Aspremont, ‘Critical histories of international law and the repression of disciplinary 
imagination’ (2019) 7 London Review of International Law 89, 91. 
6 Ibid. 102. 
7 Ibid. 112. 




extension, morally justified endeavour for a state to pursue.8 Chris af Jochnick and Roger 
Normand forcefully argue IHL ‘legitimate[s] ever more destructive methods of combat’ with 
the Hague Conventions in particular upholding, not restricting, military necessity.9 Alison 
Duxbury has argued the classification of a conflict and whether IHL applies to a situation 
‘creates silences about other types of conflict and violence that are not defined as armed 
conflicts’ removing certain types of suffering from the discussion and undermining IHL’s 
claim to humanity.10 Bellamy suffers from Duxbury’s perceived trap of the claim that IHL is 
focused on humanity. By assuming IHL’s inherent humanity, scholars are limited in their 
ability to criticise the regime and its boundaries.11 
Helen Durham has conversely made the point that IHL’s pragmatic usefulness for 
engaging non-state actors, influencing those in positions of power, and sparking the advent of 
numerous tribunals and courts to enforcement IHL, has overcome suggestions that the law 
legitimises violence.12 However, we must be careful when we discuss larger projects such as 
world peace. IHL may have pragmatic usefulness when conflict exists in the current status quo 
but what about for creating a world where peace reigns and conflict is confined to the history 
books? When thinking about war IHL has a purpose, but when thinking about peace it is 
difficult to move past Jochnick and Normand’s legitimation of violence. In this sense the 
advancement of IHL as an idea central to peace could also contradict some of Bellamy’s initial 
observations in Chapter 1. For instance, Bellamy does recognise IHL cannot always prevent 
the escalation of war (p 92), but could IHL make war more contagious? As IHL continues to 
be pragmatically useful by shielding civilian populations from the worst effects of war, the 
regulations consequently continue to be appetising to states around the world, preventing the 
more iconoclastic thinking necessary for world peace. 
 
3 The state and international organisations 
In Chapter 4 Bellamy asks why war persists? Bellamy is undeterred in his belief war persists 
because of ‘the way we organize ourselves, because war has proven itself productive at times, 
and because war is contagious’ (p 73). Bellamy’s first reason, organisation, is rooted in how 
we are divided into sub-groups. We inherently prioritise the needs of our kin over others be 
that within familial, religious, ethnic or national groups. Bellamy suggests though that states 
have found peaceful means of co-existence both within their boundaries and on the 
international plane with the proliferation of peaceful dispute settlement, international human 
rights law and a wealth of international organisations (pp 77-78). Ultimately Bellamy argues 
the state is ‘indispensable to the cause of word peace’ (p 97). Bellamy relies on the evidence 
that states today have ‘unparalleled destructive capabilities’ but they nevertheless provide more 
peaceful lives than humans would have in their absence (p 100). Bellamy outlines five 
 
8 See, eg, Chris af Jochnick and Roger Normand, ‘The Legitimation of Violence: A Critical 
History of the Laws of War’ (1994) 35 Harvard International Law Journal 49. 
9 Ibid. 51, 68. 
10 Alison Duxbury, ‘Drawing Lines in the Sand - Characterising Conflicts for the 
Purposes of Teaching International Humanitarian Law’ (2007) 8 Melbourne Journal of International 
Law 259, 268. 
11 Ibid. 270. 
12 Helen Durham, ‘International Humanitarian Law and the Gods of War: The Story of 
Athena versus Ares’ (2007) 8 Melbourne Journal of International Law 248, 250. 




characteristics of a state which he believes are important for fostering peace: (1) a monopoly 
of legitimate violence; (2) the accountability of government; (3) the protection of fundamental 
human rights; (4) the maintenance of a basic floor of economic justice; and (5) gender equality 
(pp 108-109).  
Support for Bellamy’s focus on the state can be found in the literature on ‘human 
security’. Barry Buzan has branded human security as a reductionist concept that adds little 
analytical value and reiterates that states are a ‘necessary condition for individual security 
because without the state it is not clear what other agency is to act on behalf of individuals.’13 
Other authors on human security have suggested the absence of a state and its institutions can 
in fact be damaging to human security.14 When a state does not protect its own citizens ‘people 
themselves are the main agents to provide at least some protection for themselves and others 
around.’15 But we must note ‘[p]eople are not passive recipients of “security”, or victims of its 
absence, but active subjects who can contribute directly to identifying and implementing 
solutions to security problems.’16 Bellamy and McDonald noted in 2002 that states can often 
be agents of insecurity and “the co-option of human security into a statist policy framework 
risks limiting the emancipatory potential of this security discourse.”17 The state does not 
provide security and consequently contribute to world peace in isolation. To achieve Bellamy’s 
vision of world peace we need to reshape the priorities of the state and give space for 
individuals to challenge and influence statist policy frameworks. The human security discourse 
has attempted to both change the priorities of the state, towards a people-focused approach to 
security, and open the provision of security to a wider sphere of actors who may be able to 
either inform decision making or better provide the necessary security.18 A similar approach is 
needed with regards to peace. States must adapt their decision-making processes to better 
identify and promote methods of achieving peace that mitigate the geopolitical self-interests 
that typically prevail. 
One could argue Bellamy’s above five characteristics of a state support the construction 
of the liberal peace, but in actuality Bellamy avoids grounding his suggestions in specific 
existing regimes and international systems. For example, when discussing the primacy of 
human rights, no mention is made of requiring states to ratify existing human rights treaties or 
 
13 Barry Buzan, ‘A Reductionist, Idealistic Notion that Adds Little Analytical Value’ (2004) 35 
Security Dialogue 369; Barry Buzan, ‘Human Security in International Perspective’ in Mely 
Caballero-Anthony and Jawhar Hassan (eds), The Asia Pacific in the New Millennium: Political and 
Security Challenges (Institute of Strategic and International Studies 2001) 583. 
14 Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, ‘Human Security: Concepts and Implications with an Application to Post-
Intervention Challenges in Afghanistan’ (Les Études du CERI N° 117-118, Sciences Po, 2005) 24; 
Fairlie Chappuis, ‘Human security and security sector reform: conceptual convergences in theory and 
practice’ in: Wolfgang Benedek, Matthias Kettemann and Markus Möstl (eds), Mainstreaming 
Human Security in Peace Operations and Crisis Management (Routledge 2011) 99, 109-110; See also 
Mient Jan Faber, ‘Human Security from Below: Freedom from Fear and Lifeline Operations’, in 
Monica den Boer and Jaap de Wilde (eds), The Viability of Human Security (Amsterdam University 
Press 2008). 
15 Faber (n 14) 156. 
16 Tadjbakhsh, (n 14) 25; See also Alexander Gilder, ‘International and human security in the 
kaleidoscopic world’ (2020) Indian Journal of International Law 1-25 (e-pub ahead of print).  
17 Alex J Bellamy and Matt McDonald, ‘‘The Utility of Human Security’: Which Humans? What 
Security? A Reply to Thomas & Tow’ (2002) 33 Security Dialogue 373, 374. 
18 Gilder (n 16) 17. 




enforcing the obligations through current UN treaty bodies (pp 111-112). This is important as 
it harks back to previous comments above with regards to taking a critical view of the prevailing 
norms and history of international law. Some have traditionally viewed international law and 
importantly state sovereignty as a tool of subjugation, which cannot simply be rectified by 
introducing human-focused regimes, such as human rights or economic focuses on sustainable 
development. For instance,  
‘Western states argued that they were not bound by the principles authored by the 
Third World because of the basic rule that a state could not be bound by 
international rules unless it agreed to be so bound. Nevertheless, the West 
proceeded to argue, the Third World was bound by the older rules of international 
economic law that the West had authored. Indeed, the West argued, acceptance of 
these and the other established rules of the international system was a condition of 
becoming an independent, sovereign state.’19 
Importantly, TWAIL authors have noted how states in the global North “embrace[] a divisive 
universalism” and that “[f]or many, colonialism is an anomaly of the past, now corrected by 
processes of universalism and of no further relevance as a conceptual category.”20 Whereas 
forceful arguments have been made that Europe’s policies continue to be profoundly imperial 
alongside critiques of regimes such as international human rights law, international economic 
law, and international environmental law.21 Suggestions for achieving world peace will need 
to engage with the notion that ‘everyday imperialism’ continues in the day-to-day lives of the 
global South.22 
Moving to international organisations (IOs) Bellamy suggests they are one method used 
to manage the contagion of war (pp 94-95). However, Bellamy says it is states as the primary 
institutions that foster cleavages in our relationships across the world and divisions that cause 
war whereas IOs are secondary institutions. But there is a deeper issue that can be explored 
here. Bellamy does not assess why it remains the case that IOs are unable to prevent these 
cleavages? The UN has certainly been more successful in preventing inter-state conflict than 
the League of Nations, but conflict overall still persists highlighting how we continue to 
organise ourselves into groups that wage war. Judge Abdulqawi Yusuf notes, 
‘[w]e have not yet achieved a full shift from a ‘society’ to a ‘community of 
nations’. Despite the reference in many multilateral instruments to the 
‘common concern’ of humanity, we see major initiatives launched by 
international organisations to address this ‘common concern’ amputated, 
 
19 Antony Anghie, ‘The evolution of international law: Colonial and postcolonial realities’ (2006) 27 
Third World Quarterly 739, 749. 
20 B.S. Chimni, ‘The Past, Present and Future of International Law: A Critical Third World Approach’ 
(2004) 8 Melbourne Journal of International Law 499; John Reynolds, Empire, Emergency and 
International Law (Cambridge University Press 2017) 16; See also, Mohsen al Attar, ‘Reframing the 
“Universality” of International Law in a Globalizing World’ (2013) 59 McGill Law Journal 95. 
21 Antony Anghie, ‘Europe and International Law’s Colonial Present’ (2012) 6 Baltic Yearbook of 
International Law 79, 82; See, eg, Anghie (n 19) 749; Makau Mutua, ‘Savages, Victims, and Saviors: 
The Metaphor of Human Rights’ (2001) 42 Harvard International Law Journal 201; Brian-Vincent 
Ikejiaku, ‘International Law is Western Made Global Law: The Perception of Third-World Category’ 
(2013) 6 African Journal of Legal Studies 337. 
22 Anghie (n 21) 82. 




curtailed, or outright rejected when they collide with individual State 
interests (sometimes interests of the moment) of powerful stakeholders.’23 
It may be the case that current IOs are advancing values that are not truly universal and are 
tainted by colonial legacies, such as how colonial powers remain permanent Security Council 
members.24 How then can the primary institutions (states) ever truly reconcile their differences 
even when brought together by a current IO? 
For example, exacerbating the issues surrounding IOs, Bellamy says ‘[w]hen the Great 
Powers are united, the Security Council can be an immense force for world peace...’ (p 146). 
Forming a link between the so-called Great Powers and world peace can be troubling for some, 
particularly the global South. A narrow focus on the Security Council can be exclusionary, 
emphasising the preoccupation of many scholars with the primacy of the Security Council and 
the repression of thought to the confines of existing mechanisms of international law. To 
present a more balanced view, what should be mentioned alongside the Security Council is the 
global South’s efforts in the General Assembly over the last 60 years. For example, the 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and 
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation 
among States represent key documents where new states in the global South were pivotal.25 A 
focus on the Security Council in relation to achieving world peace risks perpetuating the view 
that the traditional order of international organisations remaining under the control of 
traditional powers is the only path forward. 
 
4 Bellamy’s articles for world peace 
Chapter 8 outlines Bellamy’s core suggestions for how we can move toward world peace. 
Bellamy’s suggestions are presented in the form of a treaty with six ‘preliminary articles for 
world peace in our time’, three ‘definitive articles for world peace in our time’ and one 
‘additional imperative article for world peace in our time’ (pp 175-176). International lawyers 
will be particularly interested in the drafting choices made in these Articles and the resulting 
technicalities but there is not the space in this review essay to engage with all the articles. A 
few specific points will instead be focused on. What is immediately notable is that the articles 
are embedded in the existing systems of international law and relations. Bellamy’s suggestions 
are therefore not iconoclastic. For instance, the Security Council takes a prominent place in the 
first preliminary article. The articles are also clearly premised on a few trends including fairness 
and accountability. One risk of formulating articles that promote some of the existing norms, 
such as human rights, is that they could be viewed as part of the liberal peace. Bellamy does 
though lament the failures of liberal peacebuilding (pp 176-177). 
Preliminary Article 1 reiterates that ‘[n]o one may violate the rules of international law 
relating to the use of force and conduct of armed conflict’ and also states permanent members 
 
23 Abdulqawi Ahmed Yusuf, ‘Engaging with International Law’ (2020) 69 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 505, 508. 
24 For an alternative view see Otto Spijkers, ‘Global Values and the Institutions of the United Nations’ 
(2017) 11 Vienna Journal of International Constitutional Law 211. 
25 Georges Abi-Saab, ‘The Third World intellectual in praxis: confrontation, participation, or 
operation behind enemy lines?’ (2016) 37 Third World Quarterly 1957, 1959. 




of the Security Council may not use their veto to prevent collective action in response to armed 
aggression or international crimes (p 179). Bellamy supports this article by stating the 
‘[i]nternational order rests on mutually agreed laws’ (p 179, emphasis added). He also 
discusses how we have a shortage of compliance, not a shortage of law, and we must push 
states towards compliance (pp 180-181). One issue to raise here is that we need to think more 
deeply about compliance beyond the geopolitical reasons for non-compliance. It is true we do 
not have a shortage of law, but is the law reflective of global society? Does it encompass values 
of all humankind that could positively engender compliance or does the existing law all too 
often pit one state against another creating an us vs them rhetoric? Bellamy draws on IHL 
saying the law of armed conflict ‘prevents actors justifying the commission of great harm in 
the name of world peace’ (p 182). This can again be countered with the view that IHL does 
allow great harm by facilitating banal violence against military targets and civilians as 
collateral damage. If articles for world peace are formulated, we must question whether our 
collection of laws are the right ones or could we do better at preventing banal violence through 
law? 
Bellamy also suggests making the use of the veto much more costly politically (p 186). 
He rightfully states it would be unlikely for the permanent members of the Security Council to 
voluntarily abstain from using their veto and suggests using the Uniting for Peace resolution 
to circumvent the Security Council. Bellamy believes that only then will the Security Council 
re-evaluate their decisions to avoid being made irrelevant (p 187). Graham Melling and Anne 
Dennett have suggested in a recent article that Uniting for Peace could be used to respond to 
mass atrocities where a veto has been used illegitimately.26 Legitimacy is a thread that runs 
through Bellamy’s articles with the first definitive article suggesting ‘[e]ach state shall be a 
capable, responsible, and legitimate sovereign’ (p 175, emphasis added). Legitimacy, and 
responsibility for that matter, is necessarily subjective but Bellamy does not discuss any further 
interventions from the General Assembly that could engender more legitimate responses as 
opposed to the Security Council. 
The last point to be made here is the importance of community and the growing global 
society in a world where issues cannot be resolved by one state no matter how powerful that 
state is.27 Bellamy’s fourth definitive article declares ‘[s]tates shall establish and sustain 
security communities with their neighbours’ to promote states to think about community in the 
international space (p 194). There is a risk with this suggestion that regional divides could 
become more, not less ingrained resulting is the divisions that cause war. But Bellamy 
importantly notes that regional communities can be ‘an important bridge between local and 
national … and global’ (p 197). Building on this, the fifth definitive article states ‘[i]ndividuals 
should enjoy a universal right of hospitality. No state shall inhibit the free and fair movement 
of goods, services, people, and ideas between them’ (p 197). Bellamy alludes to online 
communication by discussing how people can connect with like-minded people in transnational 
networks, but this is more important that Bellamy lets on. The exponential increase in global 
 
26 Graham Melling and Anne Dennett, ‘The Security Council veto and Syria: responding to mass 
atrocities through the “Uniting for Peace” resolution’ (2017) 57 Indian Journal of International Law 
285. 
27 Yusuf (n 23) 508. 




online communities will shape the future of international law, the legitimacy of the actors that 
have international legal personality and ultimately, world peace.  
Bellamy’s additional imperative article suggests ‘[i]ndividuals should organize and do 
what they reasonable can to support peace’ (p 211). It is mentioned how civil society can reach 
out globally and create ‘overlapping and cosmopolitan identities and interests’ that diminish 
what divides us (p 211). This is true but it must be said that online communication transcends 
the state in so many ways. It may be the case that issues can garner positive global attention 
through online platforms that bring actors together. For instance, the global discussion of the 
Anthropocene and impact of climate change has grown exponentially because of the large 
followings of activists like Greta Thunberg and transnational groups such as Extinction 
Rebellion. UN initiatives like the 2018 General Assembly Resolution Towards a Global Pact 
for the Environment and suggestions from scholars such as Louis Kotze’s proposal for an 
‘Earth system law’ may gain more traction within these non-state transnational groups in the 
new global discourse.28 However, online discourses can also be used to spread pernicious 
misinformation on a huge scale.29 In India, WhatsApp has been used to spread misinformation, 
which has led to a number of deaths and violent attacks since 2015.30 It is increasingly difficult 
for states to regulate online activities and rapidly shared misinformation can quickly create 
crises of their own.31 Any articles for world peace will need to recognise this dynamic and 
ensure that non-traditional actors can access the international system for the system to remain 
legitimate while protecting against harmful discourses based on misinformation.32 
 
5 Conclusion 
World Peace is a work deserving of further critical engagement to dissect the steps toward 
world peace. International law scholarship can often seem preoccupied by conflict with authors 
suggesting changes that need to be made to particular regimes, but it is rare to see a piece of 
work that brings together a broad array of issues to suggest a path forward towards peace. The 
book often takes a grand historical view that misses the minutiae from an international law 
perspective, but that is of course not the purpose of the book and the grand historical view 
certainly has its benefits. It provides an accessible account of the history of peace and several 
of the power structures behind the guise of states and the systems in which they reside. The 
greatest achievement of this work is that it skilfully brings together countless important works 
 
28 UN General Assembly, ‘Towards a Global Pact for the Environment’ (14 May 2018) 
A/RES/72/277; Duncan French and Louis Kotze, ‘‘Towards a global pact for the environment’: 
international environmental law’s factual, technical and (unmentionable) normative gaps’ (2019) 28 
Review of European, Comparative and International Environmental Law 25; Louis Kotze, ‘Earth 
system law for the Anthropocene: rethinking environmental law alongside the Earth system metaphor’ 
(2020) 11 Transnational Legal Theory 75. 
29 Edith Brown Weiss, ‘The Emerging International System and Sustainable Development’ (2000) 1 
International Review for Environmental Strategies 9, 11; Edith Brown Weiss, ‘International Law in 
a Kaleidoscopic World’ (2011) 1 Asian Journal of International Law 21, 29-30. 
30 Shakuntala Banaji and Ram Bhat, ‘WhatsApp Vigilantes: An exploration of citizen reception and 
circulation of WhatsApp misinformation linked to mob violence in India’ (LSE Department of Media 
and Communications 2019) <http://www.lse.ac.uk/media-and-
communications/assets/documents/research/projects/WhatsApp-Misinformation-Report.pdf>. 
31 Gilder (n 16) 6. 
32 Ibid. 14. 




from over the centuries to form a concise account of world peace, which can be built on across 
a broad range of disciplines. World Peace provides an excellent foundation for international 
lawyers to think more deeply about peace, to undertake critical histories and, like I have started 
to do in this review, flesh out the details that international law will need to resolve to improve 
our chances of achieving world peace. Scholarship on international law will, in the future, need 
to think more resolutely about how the law’s existing systems and regimes help or hinder peace.  
